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Starting with Darwin, biologists have asked how populations evolve from a low fitness state that
is evolutionarily stable to a high fitness state that is not. Specifically of interest is the emergence
of cooperation and multicellularity where the fitness of individuals often appears in conflict with
that of the population. Theories of social evolution and evolutionary game theory have produced
a number of fruitful results employing two-state two-body frameworks. In this study we depart
from this tradition and instead consider a multi-player, multi-state evolutionary game, in which the
fitness of an agent is determined by its relationship to an arbitrary number of other agents. We show
that populations organize themselves in one of four distinct phases of interdependence depending
on one parameter, selection strength. Some of these phases involve the formation of specialized
large-scale structures. We then describe how the evolution of independence can be manipulated
through various external perturbations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative behavior, as exemplified by multicellular
life, seems to have evolved at least 25 times indepen-
dently - once for plants, once or twice for animals, once
for brown algae, and possibly several times for fungi,
slime molds, and red algae [1]. On shorter time-scales,
the social composition of eukaryotes such as S. cerevisiae,
and biofilm forming bacteria such as P. aeruginosa can
dramatically change in a brief period [2–5]. In a re-
lated context, tumor formation is a rare example of the
transition, taking place in the reverse direction, from a
multicellular to an essentially unicellular lifestyle. Inter-
estingly, cancer cells end up cooperating by collectively
secreting angiogenic factors, and it seems possible, at
least in principle, that there may even be cheaters (i.e.
those who do not secrete the growth factors) among this
collection of cooperating cheaters [6, 7].
Evolutionary game theory provides excellent insight
into how altruistic and cooperative behavior can emerge
to maximize the fitness of the group despite the appar-
ent fitness advantage of cheating individuals [8, 9]. In
the context of evolution of cooperation, these models
typically investigate the outcome of repeated runs of the
prisoner’s dilemma between pairs of agents that have two
strategies, cheating and cooperating. Variants of the
model include structured interactions, coupled popula-
tions, coevolution, stored reputation, punishment, and
preferential or random partner choosing [10–18].
However, real life is more complicated in a number
of ways. First, many actual games are massively multi-
player [19–22]. The fitness of an organism may depend
on its simultaneous relationship with multiple players.
Second, biology allows for a much larger variety of inter-
nal states beyond cooperating or defecting. For example,
the genetic makeup of an organism may be suitable for
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cooperation with only an exclusive few, while some or-
ganisms may be incapable of defecting or cooperating all
together. Third, real social evolution leads to highly or-
ganized dependence structures beyond the homogeneous
mixtures or aggregates of cooperator-defector states that
we often see in the majority of evolutionary game mod-
els. From biochemical to societal scales, life organizes
itself in highly complex arrangements of cliques, com-
munities, cycles and hierarchies.
Without compromising the simplicity and tractabil-
ity offered by traditional evolutionary game theory, here
we propose an evolutionary model in which the fitness
of an agent is determined, not by the outcome of a
two-player two-state game, but instead a multi-player
multi-state one. Thus, our focus is not the coopera-
tor / defector ratio in the population, but rather the
large-scale structure of all exchanges; i.e. the interde-
pendence between agents or groups of agents within a
genetically heterogeneous population. We ask how in-
dependent agents become interdependent through the
simple laws of evolution, whether positive selection is a
necessary or a sufficient condition for the formation of in-
terdependence, what kinds of interdependent structures
are stable / unstable, and how these structures and pro-
cesses depend on evolutionary parameters. Accordingly,
the present model offers a clear framework for classi-
fying and categorizing different regimes of interdepen-
dence, as well as allowing for careful control of evolu-
tionary parameters that may be influencing recent non-
intuitive empirical outcomes [23]. We determine which
kinds of external perturbations promote anti-sociality
(e.g. in order to eradicate biofilms) and which other
kinds can inhibit anti-sociality (e.g. as to suppress or
reverse tumor growth) by simulating the introduction of
selfish/altruistic strains into a population or the admin-
istration of anti-sociality/sociality promoting drugs. We
evaluate the success rate of these evolutionary interven-
tions as a function of the original population structure,
drug dose, fraction of drug-resistant agents, and repro-
duction speed of the target species.
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FIG. 1. Schematic of the model. The evolutionary algo-
rithm is carried out by assuming that (1) fitness of a node
ω(xi) is a monotonically increasing function of edge influx
xi = bni,in − cni,out, where ni,in and ni,out are the number
of in and out edges for node i. (2) reproduction preserves all
in-out relationships with r fittest nodes replacing the least
fittest nodes, and (3) a small number of edges are randomly
added/removed every generation, with probability p 1.
II. MODEL
Our multi-state multi-player game can be best visu-
alized as a network of N  1 agents, connected by di-
rectional edges. An edge from A to B indicates that A
contributes to the fitness of B at the cost of its own.
Unlike the typical evolutionary game theoretic models
where the state of a player i is binary (cooperator /
cheater), here the player states ψi are characterized by
high-dimensional vectors, i.e. ψi = {x1, x2, . . . , xN}
with xj ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether i provides a fitness
benefit to j. The evolutionary dynamics is governed by
the following assumptions (Fig[1]):
(1) The fitness ω(xi) of a node i is assumed to be a
monotonically increasing function of received net benefit
xi = bni,in−cni,out, where ni,in and ni,out are the number
of in and out edges for node i. The parameter β = b/c
quantifies the benefit of an edge (to the receiver) relative
to its cost (to the provider).
(2) Every generation, the r most fit nodes produce
offspring that replace the r least fit nodes. Reproduction
preserves all edge relationships of the parent, i.e. parents
and offspring connect to the same agents.
(3) There is a small mutation probability p per gen-
eration with which edges are added/removed randomly.
In other words, we have a fitness-based selection rule
keeping the number of agents N constant. Our simula-
tion code is available as an electronic supplement.
Our model has four parameters, kept constant
throughout the course of evolution: Population size N ,
mutation probability p, number selected for replacement
r, and the relative benefit β. For every run we keep track
of the total number of edges E(t) as a function of genera-
tion number t. E(t) is a measure of the interdependence
of the population as well as the average fitness (the latter
follows from 〈ω〉 = ∑i ωi/N = (β−1)E(t)/N , which can
be positive or negative depending on the value of β). In
addition, we study the community structures and genetic
composition within the population, which are defined in
terms of the connectivity matrix C of the network. We
use the convention that Cij = 1 if j depends on i, and 0
otherwise, and represent these by black and white pixels
in array plots. Our simulations were run for N = 200,
partly due to computational constraints. Although this
might appear small, we note that the relevant degree of
freedom here is the number of edge slots N2 = 4× 104,
ensuring that the evolutionary transitions we report are
not accidental fluctuations.
III. RESULTS
The evolutionary dynamics and final interdependence
states depend on the values of β and relative selection
pressure r/m, where m = N2p is the expected number of
mutations per generation (which is equal to the number
of mutants if p 1). We can divide the parameter space
into four regimes: Neutral constructive (r  m,β > 1),
selective constructive (O[r] ∼ O[m], β > 1)), neutral
destructive (r  m,β < 1) and selective destructive
(O[r] ∼ O[m], β < 1). In all cases, the formation of an
edge is beneficial for one of the nodes and deleterious for
the other. However the value of β determines the change
in average fitness per edge, d〈ω〉/dE = c(β − 1)/N , and
therefore one intuitively expects E(t) to decrease for β <
1 and increase for β > 1 as long as selection strength is
finite. We will see that this expectation will not always
be satisfied, particularly when β > 1.
Let us start with the straightforward case of β < 1.
Here the formation of an edge is more deleterious to its
originator than beneficial to its target, and the fitness of
the population changes by b− c < 0 per edge. Thus, in
the long run, only if the selection is weak (r  m) can
such deleterious edges accumulate, and we get a random
interdependence network with E = N2/2. As expected,
increasing r/m causes the network to become sparse and
fragmented, and all structure vanishes as O[r] ∼ O[m].
We now overview the constructive regime β > 1, which
produces distinct phases of complexity (Fig[2], panels 1-
6). The long term behavior of E(t), which can be viewed
as a proxy for average fitness as well as interdependence
and complexity, depends non-monotonically on selective
pressure r/m: For small values of r/m, the asymptotic
value E(t→∞) decreases with r/m (Fig[2], panels 1-3).
However if r/m exceeds a critical point we see sudden
transitions between well-defined discrete levels (Fig[2],
panels 4-6). As selective pressure is increased further, we
see increasingly larger fluctuations around these levels.
We describe these asymptotic states in more detail by
connectivity matrices (Fig[3], top row) and phylogenetic
trees (Fig[3] bottom row) for varying levels of r/m. The
phylogenetic trees are obtained by quantifying the sim-
ilarity distance Dij =
∑
k |Cik − Cjk| +
∑
k |Cki − Ckj |
between all pairs of nodes i and j. In other words, if i
and j receive from and provide to the same nodes, they
are considered to be genetically related, consistent with
our reproduction rule (cf. Fig[1]).
While the destructive β < 1 regime produces ei-
ther random or sparse networks, the constructive regime
β > 1 can be summarized in terms of a sequence of com-
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FIG. 2. Regimes of constructive evolution (β > 1). Plotted is the number of edges E(t) as a function of time (generations)
t, as the selection strength is increased from left to right r = 2, 4, 9, 10, 15, 100 while mutation probability is kept constant
N2p = 20. The dashed straight lines indicate the stable number of edges corresponding to an integer number k of equal-sized
“bunches”, E = N2
(
1− 1
k
)
. The dashed curved line is the outcome of the fully neutral simulation (r = 0). For all panels
N = 200, β = 1.01.
plex phases governed by the value of r/m (Fig[4]): A
transition from cooperation to competition between in-
dividuals (Fig[2] panels 1-3) is followed by unstable inter-
actions between individuals and “bunches” (Fig[2] panel
4), followed by a transition from cooperation to compe-
tition between “bunches” (Fig[2] panels 5-6). We define
a bunch to be the opposite of a graph theoretical com-
munity; a group of nodes that form denser connections
towards other groups, than they do within (cf. latter two
panels in Fig[3]). Dense outwards connections and sparse
intra-connections are the key qualitative characteristic of
a highly specialized system. For example, nearly all en-
ergy spent by a heart muscle cell is directed at serving
other tissues. The same holds true in a specialized soci-
ety, e.g. a lawyer dedicates most of her effort defending
non-lawyers. The interdependence structures we report
in the latter two panels of Fig[3], conform to these bio-
logical and social examples of specialization.
We now move towards an understanding of the control
and manipulation of the evolution of interdependence,
which is now experimentally possible (albeit with mixed
success) in biomedical and ecological settings. For exam-
ple, the sociality of P. aeruginosa can be manipulated
by drugs that suppress the microbe’s production of a
common good (iron scavenging siderophores). Since the
microbes that are resistant to the drug will altruistically
continue to produce the expensive siderophores, they are
taken over by their selfish counterparts affected by the
drug [5, 24, 25]. As a result, the iron-deficient popu-
lation can be easily annihilated by the host’s immune
system [26]. Note that the evolutionary fate of the drug-
resistant group would have been the opposite, had the
drug been an antibiotic instead of a quorum blocker. On
the other hand, there have also been experiments yield-
ing the exact opposite outcome, where the drug aggra-
vates the infection instead of impairing it, presumably
by leveling the relative advantage of cheaters [23]. We
will use our model to quantify these mixed outcomes.
Social evolution is complex, and its manipulation and
control requires a detailed quantitative understanding of
the evolutionary outcomes of varying initial states and
system parameters.
To manipulate the sociality of a highly interdependent,
β > 1 population, we start with an initial network that
has a given community structure, select a fraction η of
the population, and block a fraction γ of their outgoing
connections of those that are selected. Following this
perturbation, we track the evolution of the network and
check if our perturbation causes the entire population to
lose all connections (which, for β > 1, amounts to min-
imal fitness). If E(t) drops to and remains at zero we
count it as a success and we determine the fraction of
successes for every parameter value. If η  1, the per-
turbation can be interpreted as an external introduction
of a new strain/species, or a novel mutation which intro-
duces a very small number of selfish individuals in the
population. If η ' 1 the perturbation can be interpreted
as a drug or event that inflicts nearly everyone, such as
the quorum blocker discussed earlier. Accordingly, the
quantity γ can be interpreted as the dose of the drug,
or the degree of “selfishness” of the newly introduced
species/strain.
Fig[5] displays the dependence of success as a func-
tion of η (empty vs. closed plot markers correspond
to η = 2% and 98%), initial population structure k
(quantifying the number of bunches) and γ. We con-
sider fast reproducing and slow reproducing species sep-
arately, shown in the left and right panels respectively.
It is important to distinguish between two very dif-
ferent mechanisms that bring the population back to
its pre-perturbed state. The first is determined by the
time required for interdependence to evolve anew from
E = 0. The original factors causing the establishment
of cooperation in the first place is present regardless of
4FIG. 3. Interdependence and genetic composition. Connectivity matrices (top) and their respective phylogenetic trees
(bottom) show the dramatic difference in the final organization of the population caused by varying selective strength (left
to right, r = 0, 2, 4, 15, 100) in the constructive regime (β > 1). The connectivity matrix element Cij is marked by black if
individual i provides fitness to j, and left white if there is no exchange. The tree linkages in the bottom are formed according
to smallest intercluster dissimilarity, defined by the L1 norm. For all panels N = 200, N
2p = 20, β = 1.01 is kept constant.
We see the onset of “bunch” (anti-community) formation even in the weak selection limit (compare panel 1 to 2). The number
and definition of bunches increases with higher selection strength (panel 4). In the strong selection limit bunches compete
with each other, leading to size heterogeneity (panel 5).
our perturbation, and the effect of even the strongest
drug (η = 1, γ = 1) is to simply reset the evolutionary
clock. The second mechanism is evolution through the
repopulation of the drug-resistant fraction, which hap-
pens much faster, on reproductive time-scales. To clearly
distinguish between these two mechanisms, we set p = 0
in Fig[5]; using a finite p scales down all the success
rates, but does not otherwise change the qualitative de-
pendence on η, γ and k.
We observe a number of interesting features in the
response of the population to external perturbations.
For η ' 1 we find a non-monotonic dependence of suc-
cess rate to β for populations with few bunches: For
slow reproducing populations a moderate dose works as
well as, or better than, a strong one. For larger num-
ber of bunches, and faster reproduction rates the non-
monotonicity vanishes: The stronger the dose, the better
the outcome. A second remarkable outcome is the de-
gree to which a few individuals can make a difference:
Targeting η = 2% of the population is as effective as
targeting η = 98% of the population provided the drug
has a high enough dose. This is because few selfish in-
dividuals, as is the case in tumors or invasive species,
can devastate an entire population. Finally, we observe
a very strong dependence of the success rate on the ini-
tial community structure. With increasing k and r this
difference vanishes.
IV. DISCUSSION
The phase diagram for the evolution of interdepen-
dence is shown in Fig[4] and compactly summarizes our
results. Panel 1 shows the number of dependences, while
Panel 2 quantifies their structure through “bunch mod-
ularity”. We define the latter by exchanging 1 ↔ 0 in
the connectivity matrix and determining the community
modularity. Throughout, we will discuss and label sep-
arate phases of interdependence by letters A-D.
A. Cooperation Between Individuals
In the neutral regime (r  m) additions and deletions
of edges are equally likely. Thus, if the population starts
fully independent, E(t) increases until the network is
fully randomized with N2/2 edges. This increase is sta-
tistically irreversible, and is the analogue of the scenario
described in [27–29]. In the neutral regime individu-
als have high fitness due to the benefits of indirect reci-
procity; interdependence emerges not due to higher fit-
ness but simply due to higher likelihood. Fig[1a] shows
the dynamics and final outcome of nearly-neutral evo-
lution. Despite following a similar trajectory to fully-
neutral evolution (E(t) ∼ N2(1− e−2pNt), indicated by
the dashed curve in all panels of Fig[2]), the connectivity
matrix shows the onset of community formation; the in-
terdependence structure and genetic composition of the
population is far from random (compare Fig[3a, 3b]).
As the selection strength is increased (r < m but not
r  m) the fluctuations in E(t) are amplified. This is
caused by the random formation of nodes for which the
number of in-edges are different than out-edges. How-
ever the system is self stabilizing (Fig[2], panels 1,2); e.g.
when the fit defectors reproduce, they typically replace
their unfit providers, which in turn reduces their own
fitness. Consequently they are taken over by the fair
and fit nodes that dominate the r  m population. In
5Number of
Dependences
5000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
642046
2 4 6 8 10 12
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
Selection Strength r
B
en
ef
it
Β
AntiCommunity
Modularity
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
642046
2 4 6 8 10 12
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
Selection Strength r
B
en
ef
it
Β
B nch 
Modularity
Number of
Dependences


           




 




 



 

 

 
  


    

 




      

  


   
   




         
Benefit Β:
 2.
 1.3
 1.1
 1.09
 1.03
 0.98
 0.5
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 140
5000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
35 000
Selection Strength, r Selection Strength, r
B
un
ch
 M
od
ul
ar
ity
   
         

  

 
   








 

   


   


 




    








    
 





  
     
Benefit Β:
 2.
 1.3
 1.1
 1.09
 1.03
 0.98
 0.5
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
N
um
be
r o
f D
ep
en
de
nc
es
FIG. 4. Phases of interdependence. The phase dia-
grams (top row) displays the asymptotic dependence num-
ber E (left) or the bunch modularity (right) as a function
of relevant system parameters. Traversing both phase dia-
grams (bottom row) in the horizontal direction clarifies the
phase profile. Since the some of the phases are highly dy-
namic, the E (left-top) is taken to be the minimum number
of dependences in a large time-window in the long-time limit.
Fig[3] panel 3, two large reciprocating groups can be dis-
tinguished. They are taken advantage by smaller scale
opportunistic sub-populations. It is also possible to see
a smaller sub-cooperative group sustaining itself within
a larger cooperative group.
B. Competition Between Individuals
As r approaches rc ∼ m/2 from below, the fluctua-
tions in E(t) become comparable to E(t) itself. Here
the selective competition is just high enough to allow for
small cooperative communities to form and grow at a
rate much higher than random chance, but also high
enough for cheaters to spread over their providers in
one step, beyond recovery (Fig[1], panel 3). Although
regime A and B have similar destabilizing factors, their
re-stabilization is very different. The drops in E(t) in
regime A can recover through re-population, over time
scales ∼ 1/r. In contrast regime B exhibits system-size
losses from which the only way to recover is re-mutation,
over longer time scales determined by ∼ 1/m2, as the
smallest cooperative group requires two mutations.
Comparing A to B reveals that higher selection
strength in this case leads to lower fitness; had one mixed
the stronger-selected population B with the weaker-
selected one A, the former would be driven to extinc-
tion. The behavior of B is similar to that expected in
a classical prisoner’s dilemma, which emerges from our
model as a special case - survival of the fittest produces
the globally least fit outcome.
C. Formation of Specialized Bunches
As r is increased above the critical point rc ∼ m/2
higher structures start to form. While the connectiv-
ity matrix C is sparse and random for r just below rc,
we start seeing metastable bunches at r > rc, the num-
ber and stability of which increases with r. The sudden
jump in the edge number we see in Fig[3], panels 4-5 is
analogous to that found in [30].
For a very large window of selective strength O[m] ∼
r < O[N ], we see that the system can only maintain
certain discrete values of E. These are the stable con-
figurations corresponding to an integer number of equal
sized bunches (k) given by the relation Ek = N
2
(
1− 1k
)
,
k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , kmax (Fig[2] panel 4). The maximum
number of bunches kmax is determined by the mutation
rate, kmax ∼ N/m (i.e. so that in steady state there
is one mutation per bunch per time step). However,
we have observed k transiently increasing to 50% higher
than this value. Note that the degree of interdependence
(and hence the average fitness) in the strong selection
limit well exceeds that in the weak selection limit.
It is interesting that in the limit r,m ∼ 1, we see
structures more complex than bunches. These include
hierarchies (smaller bunches within a bunch), cycles (3
or more groups providing to one other), and hierarchies
of cycles (cycles within a cycle). In this limit the dynam-
ics of E(t) still exhibits discrete steps similar to Fig[2]
panel 5, however with more possible metastable plateaus
corresponding to unequal sized matrix blocks.
D. Competition Between Bunches
With increasing r the fluctuation in the number of
edges around the stable k starts increasing, and we see
destructive competition similar to that near the phase
boundary of B; however, now the competition is between
the bunches rather than the individuals, which creates
significant size differences between them. These fluctu-
ations can lead to one bunch replacing another, causing
Ek to make large transitions between different values of
k. Despite the apparent noise (Fig[2] panel 6) the depen-
dence structure remains in a highly ordered state with
high reciprocity. As r is increased further we see that
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FIG. 5. Manipulation and Control of Social evolu-
tion. Of the entire population (N=200) we mark η = 2%
(empty markers) and η = 98% (filled markers) of the nodes
as susceptible to our perturbation. We then block γ (hori-
zontal axis) of the out edges of the susceptible population,
and determine the probability that the strong cooperating
population collapses into a weak non-cooperating one (i.e to
E = 0). To clearly distinguish between the spread of the re-
sistant subpopulation η, and novel mutations that occur after
our perturbation, we set p = 0 (finite p merely adds noise to
the curves). We observe that the effect of the drug strongly
depends on the community structure for slow reproducing
species (left, r = 15) but not for fast reproducing ones (right,
r = 60). The dashed curve shows how devastating even a
small number of antisocial individuals be for the whole pop-
ulation, and suggests treatments where individual cells are
targeted. The strong dependence of annihilation probabil-
ity on k for small k (left panel) might explain why quorum
blockers are effective against some biofilms forming bacteria
but not others. Interestingly, for k = 2, P (γ = 0.5) is sig-
nificantly higher than P (γ = 0.95), suggesting that for small
number of cooperative bunches smaller perturbations may be
more effective than larger ones.
competition between bunches cause fluctuations compa-
rable to the size of bunches. i.e. a small bunch can
increase in size by spreading over others until another
metastable structure re-evolves.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have constructed a simple model that allows us
to study the co-evolution of self-replicating interdepen-
dent structures, and reported multiple evolutionary tran-
sitions as β and r are varied. This model is quite gen-
eral and has very few assumptions - the fitness function
is only assumed to be an arbitrary increasing function
of x and there are only two relevant parameters govern-
ing the dynamics (selection strength r/m and relative
benefit b/c) since the population size N does not make
a qualitative difference as long as both Np and r are
much smaller than N . Furthermore, the value β does
not make a qualitative difference apart from whether it
is larger or smaller than unity, and no quantitative dif-
ference if |1− β| is smaller than 1/N . Unlike the typical
simplified models of evolutionary game theory we do not
assume that an individual’s behavior is the same towards
all others (although some individuals can end up in a
state where they give to all and receive from all). In this
respect the states allowed in this work is a generaliza-
tion of the two-state models common in the literature.
Thus, we hope that our model can serve as a guiding
framework for understanding the emergence of sociality.
Even in this simple case, we observe a number of sur-
prising and important phenomena. First, we report that
even the weakest selection strengths (m  r) can pro-
duce interdependence structures that are far from ran-
dom. Thus, assumptions regarding “random interdepen-
dence” invoked by neutral evolutionary arguments may
be too strong [27–29]. Our second observation is the
natural emergence of specialized bunches and multi scale
structures from the simple laws of evolutionary dynam-
ics. As we probe the response of the system to various se-
lection strengths, we see regimes of random interdepen-
dence, competition between nodes, cooperation between
nodes (bunches) and competition between bunches.
Thirdly we report that the regime β > 1, r > 0
does not ensure complex interdependence. There exists a
“dead zone” within the constructive regime (Fig[2c]) due
to the competition between agents. This non-monotonic
dependence of E on selection strength can have im-
portant implications in medicine. For example, biofilm
populations may be induced into a less virulent non-
cooperative state by decreasing the selective pressure,
so that a cooperative film behaving as Fig[2e] evolves
into an intermediate non-cooperative state behaving as
Fig[2c]. This may be experimentally verified in P. aerug-
inosa by increasing the available iron while keeping their
population constant by limiting their carbon source.
Another remarkable result is the non-monotonic con-
nection between anti-social drug dose and the successful
annihilation of cooperativeness. Indeed, the model ex-
hibits a a “contagion” effect which allows the manipu-
lation of a few individuals to have population-wide ef-
fects. It has been noted that introducing several selfish
mutants (or using an anti-social drug effective on a few
individuals) may be far more effective than manipulating
an entire population [23] and is consistent with experi-
mental observations [5, 24, 25].
Finally, when mutation rate is set to zero we observe
that the behavior of E(t) resembles that of classical pop-
ulation dynamics. The dynamics between providers and
receivers becomes qualitatively similar to that between
the predators and prey of a Lotka-Volterra type system.
Starting from a randomized connectivity matrix and set-
ting p = 0, it is common for E(t) to reach a fixed value
and oscillate around it.
Due to its generality and applicability, our model has
room for many natural extensions. For example, the dis-
tribution of parameters and fitness functions in a more
realistic model could include spatial, temporal and indi-
vidual heterogeneity. Further, the quantities p, b and
c can be dynamic as they are themselves, to an ex-
tent, subject to evolutionary forces. This can lead to
a very interesting set of potential future studies explor-
ing connections between interdependence and evolvabil-
7ity/efficiency. Another factor not taken into account
here is the possibility of the change in population size
due to statistical fluctuations (e.g. due to a time depen-
dent energy input, or infection/predation). Such exten-
sions would be appropriate to address systems in ecol-
ogy, structured biological population, and provide in-
sight into complicated social trends.
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